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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL SHURTLEFF, MAX S. 
ANDREWS, NED SHURTLEFF, 
HARVEY R. CARSON and GARRY 
R. COLE, General Partners, 
dba AMERICAN SALES COMPANY 
(ASCO), a Utah Limited 
Partnership, 
vs. 
Plaintiffs and 
Respondents 
JAY TUFT & COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation, 
Defendant and 
Appellant 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
Case No. 164 70 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
JAY TUFT & COMPANY, a Utah corporation, (hereinafter 
termed the "Defendant"), in its appeal to this Court, 
seeks to reverse the judgment on a jury verdict which 
awarded AMERICAN SALES C0!1PANY (ASCO), a Utah Limited 
Partnership, (hereinafter termed the "Plaintiffs"), the 
sum of $15,651.73 representing parts, labor and repairs 
to a backhoe leased by the Plaintiffs to the Defendant. 
The Defendant also seeks a new trial on its Counterclaim, 
which the jury rejected, and a new trial dealing with 
delinquent rentals, which the jury awarded to the Plaintiffs. 
The Defendant bases its challenge to the jury verdict 
upon six separate grounds. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Plaintiffs seek affirmance of the Judgment on 
Verdict of Jury, the Order of the trial court denying 
the Defendant's Motion to Amend Judgment or in the 
Alternative for a New Trial and, in addition, seek an 
award of Plaintiffs' costs on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
While certain of the facts stated by the Defendant 
are correct and undisputed, others are argumentative and 
represent the Defendant's version of the evidence. The 
essential facts are that the Defendant leased from the 
Plaintiffs, pursuant to a written agreement, a used 
American Hydraulic Backhoe, Model 35, for the period 
March 21, 1977 to January 20, 1978. The agreement, [Ex. 
P-1], provided in pertinent part that the lease term 
would be for a minimum of thirty (30) days and such 
additional days as the Defendant required the backhoe. 
The lease rate negotiated by the parties was $4,800.00 
per month plus applicable taxes of $240.00 per month, a 
total of $5,040.00 per month. The agreement could be 
terminated by either party upon five (5) days written 
notice and contained an option in favor of the Defendant 
to purchase the backhoe. The option to purchase was not 
exercised by the Defendant at any time. 
The Defendant had previously leased this same 
backhoe from the Plaintiffs under two separate lease 
agreements. (Tr. 110). The Defendant was fully acquainted 
-2-
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with the capabilities of the machine. Prior to the 
commencement of the subject lease, the backhoe was 
serviced by the Plaintiffs and checked by the Defendant. 
[Ex. P-4]. During the lease term the backhoe required 
maintenance, servicing, repairs and parts. At no time 
did the Defendant terminate the lease agreement. 
The Defendant refused to pay the rental payments 
from October, 1977 through January, 1978 totalling 
$20,167.75 and charges for parts, labor and repairs in 
the sum of $15,651.73. [Ex. P-22]. Following repossession 
of the backhoe, the above-entitled action was commenced 
in the District Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE JURY VERDICT AWARDING TO THE PLAINTIFFS 
$15,651.73 FOR REPAIRS TO THE BACKHOE IS 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Defendant argues in Point I of its Brief that the 
verdict for repairs was not supported by the evidence for 
the following reasons: 
1. The Defendant is not liable for repairs 
under the lease agreement because: (a) the lease is 
silent as to who has the responsibility to pay for 
the repairs (Appellant's Brief at 23); (b) therefore, 
the custom and usage of the industry with respect to 
repairs controls, (Appellant's Brief at 27); (c) all 
witnesses who testified as to custom and usage said 
that the custom in the industry is that the lessor 
-3-
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(Plaintiffs) pays for all repairs except those repairs 
caused by operator abuse or the lessee's negligence 
and except for the replacement of filters and bucket 
teeth, (Appellant's Brief at 26-30); and (d) there 
was no evidence of operator abuse (Appellant's Brief 
Point !(2) at 20). 
2. Defendant should not be held liable for the 
repairs because the mechanics that performed the repairs 
were incompetent. (Appellant's Brief Point I(l)). 
3. Plaintiffs are not the real party in interest. 
(Appellant's Brief Point !(6)). 
4. The Plaintiffs will be unjustly enriched if 
they recover for repairs. (Appellant's Brief Point 
I (7)). 
A careful review of the Defendant's Brief and its 
shot-gun approach to the issues already tried in this 
case, suggests nothing more than a re-hash of the same 
arguments made to the jury at trial and argued to the 
court in Defendant's post-trial motions. Both the jury 
and the court rejected all such arguments. 
Without completely reviewing nearly one thousand 
(1,000) pages of testimony in this case, it is sufficient 
to say that the jury heard and considered the evidence 
presented, as did the court, and in considering and 
weighing such evidence, determined to reJect the claim of 
the Defendant and awarded damages to the Plaintiffs. That 
such verdict will not be overturned and will be affirmed 
-4-
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unless there is substantial and prejudicial error (which 
cannot be supported by the record in this case) has long 
been the law in the State of Utah as enunciated by this 
Court. In Gilhespie v. DeJong, 520 P.2d 878, 880 (Utah, 
1974), Mr. Justice Crockett wrote: 
That the parties appear to have had 
what they are entitled to: a full and fair 
opportunity to present their contentions, 
and the evidence supporting them, to the 
court and jury, and to have a verdict and 
judgment entered thereon. When this has 
been done, all presumptions are in favor of 
the validity of the verdict and judgment; 
and this court will not disturb them unless 
there is substantial and prejudicial error, 
absent which there is a reasonable likelihood 
that there would have been a different 
result. 
See also, Thomas v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 
548 P.2d 621 (Utah 1976). 
So it is in the case sub judice. For a period of 
nine (9) days the parties offered evidence to support 
their respective positions. The documentary evidence 
submitted by the Defendant numbered in the hundreds of 
pages. No argument can be made that the Defendant was 
not given a full and fair opportunity to present its 
contentions. While some of the evidence was conflicting, 
the jury sorted that evidence and rendered a verdict. 
The trial court, after due consideration of the post-
trial motions of the Defendant, likewise rejected the 
Defendant's contentions. 
The Defendant commences its argument with the 
assertion that the seven (7) women on the jury did not 
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understand the technical aspects of the backhoe as related 
to the ~epairs in this case. (Appellant's Brief at 9). It 
is noted that in the exercise of the Defendant's peremptory 
challenges to the jury, the Defendant elected to strike 
three (3) males from the panel. [R. 249]. At no time 
prior to the filing of the Appellant's Brief has the Defendant 
raised the issue of the makeup of the jury panel. The Defendant 
should not now be permitted to assert such a challenge, and 
the same should be stricken by this Court. 
A. THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY ESTABLISHES THAT 
DEFENDANT WAS LIABLE UNDER THE LEASE TO PAY 
FOR ALL REPAIRS IRRESPECTIVE OF THE CAUSE. 
1. The Lease Expressly Provides That The 
Lessee, Defendant, Shall Pay for Repairs. 
The arguments advanced by the Defendant, both at 
trial and before this Court, are predicated upon an 
interpretation of the equipment lease agreement [Ex. P-1] 
executed by the parties. Contrary to Defendant's assertion, 
the agreement is not silent on the question of repairs. 
The agreement provides that the " ••• Lessee shall keep 
the equipment in good repair and condition II (Emphasis 
added). The plain reading of that portion of the lease 
places the responsibility and duty of keeping the equipment 
in good repair and condition squarely on the lessee. 
It is undisputed and a matter of common knowledge 
that in every equipment lease transaction such equipment 
will, through normal use, depreciate and experience some 
wear and tear. The Defendant argues, however, that all 
repairs performed on the backhoe were the result of "reasonable 
-6-
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wear and tear" and are the responsibility of the lessor, 
excepting only those repairs required by reason of the 
lessee's negligence in the operation of the backhoe. 
(Appellant's Brief at 26-30). Such an interpretation 
renders the duty placed upon the lessee to "keep the 
equipment in good repair and condition" meaningless and 
without any force or effect whatever. 
The lease further provides that the lessee " ••• 
will return the equipment in as good condition as when 
leased, including final servicing, reasonable wear and 
tear excepted." [Ex. P-1). It of course goes without 
saying that when a piece of construction equipment is 
returned following its use on a construction project, the 
tracks have been worn, the paint has deteriorated, the 
integral parts of the machine have experienced some wear 
and the machine is not in "mint" condition. That is not 
to say that the backhoe in this case could have been 
returned by the Defendant under the express terms of the 
agreement with a broken axle, with a malfunctioning and 
inoperable charging system and a hydraulic system which 
was totally contaminated. Such, however, is the position 
the Defendant now in effect urges. The Plaintiffs submit 
that the language in the lease agreement excepting reasonable 
wear and tear applies to the condition of the equipment 
when it is returned and does not modify, change or render 
a nullity the language which requires the lessee to keep 
the equipment in good repair and condition. 
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2. The Evidence Establishes That Both 
Parties Interpreted The Lease as 
:Reguiring the Lessee to Pay for Repairs. 
Defendant's argument that the maintenance and servicing 
of the machine was the responsibility of the Plaintiffs is 
unreasonable and has no basis in the evidence. It is 
undisputed that the backhoe once leased is in the exclusive 
control of the Defendant. Somehow the Defendant seeks to 
impose upon the Plaintiffs a duty to service the equipment, 
maintain it and repair it, even though such equipment was 
operated by Defendant on its construction projects miles 
from the Plaintiffs' business. 
The lease agreement is captioned nBare Rental w/Option 
to Purchase". The lease agreement specifies the lessee's 
duty to keep the equipment in good repair and condition. 
Mr. Carson, one of the Plaintiffs' partners, testified 
that during the lease period the Plaintiffs did not rent 
equipment on a basis where the Plaintiff paid for repairs 
and servicing. {Tr. 24). Contrary to Defendant's contention, 
the lease rate did not include a reserve for repairs. 
{Tr. 24). Mr. Carson further testified that had the lease 
rate included servicing and maintenance, the lease rate 
would have been significantly higher. {Tr. 83) In fact, 
the negotiated lease rate was lower than the suggested 
industry rate on the subject backhoe by $2,000.00 per 
month. {Tr. 82). Mr. Baldwin also testified that maintenan~ 
and servicing was the responsibility of the Defendant (Tr. 
323 and 342). 
-8-
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More importantly, the Defendant recognized its respon-
sibilit~. Mr. Williams, one of the Defendant's mechanics, 
testified that he spent some 13 hours on the maintenance, 
servicing and repair of the machine on the Decker Lake 
project alone. Mr. Broadhead, the Defendant's maintenance 
man, testified that he was employed by the Defendant for 
the purpose of maintaining the machine and completed check 
lists of forms indicating the services that were performed 
on a regular basis. [Ex. D-41); (Tr. 609). Mr. Bowers, 
an employee of the Defendant, completed repairs on the 
backhoe as well. (Tr. 613). The Defendant paid the 
Plaintiff for repairs on the backhoe in the sum of $315.97. 
(Tr. 193); [Ex. P-20). 
The Defendant argues that the policy of Plaintiffs, 
as indicated by their conduct, was to pay for repairs. In 
fact, the testimony of Plaintiffs' witnesses, Mr. Hulse 
and Mr. Carson, was to the effect that although the respon-
sibility for repairs rests exclusively with the lessee, 
when the Defendant indicated a real interest in purchasing 
the machine, the Plaintiffs, for the purpose of maintaining 
a good rapport with the Defendant, were more lenient in 
charging for repairs. (Tr. 59, 172-73). Contrary to the 
argument of Defendant, Mr. Hulse did E.Q! testify that 
Plaintiffs would pay for all of the repairs occasioned by 
Defendant's use of the machine. (Tr. 175). Mr. Hulse 
only testified that if the lessee had a problem, Plaintiffs 
would send a mechanic out to fix it, but that the lease 
required the Defendant to pay for parts and service. (Tr. 
175). 
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Nor did Mr. Hulse testify that such maJor items as a 
broken axle or an alternator would be paid by Plaintiffs. 
Mr. Hulse only observed that if an axle were found to be 
defective, it would be repaired by Asco. (Tr. 145-47). 
There was no such evidence in this case. Mr. Hulse further 
testified that while a malfunctioning alternator would be 
considered a major problem, he did not specifically indicate 
that such an item would, as a matter of policy under the 
lease, be repaired at Plaintiffs' expense. (Tr. 147). 
Mr. Hulse did testify that under the circumstances of 
this case, the decision as to who would bear the cost for 
an item of repair depended, to some extent, upon whether 
the problem was caused by operator abuse or improper 
maintenance. (Tr. 145-46, 177). The evidence, taken as a 
whole, overwhelmingly supports the argument that the major 
problems with the backhoe were caused directly by the poor 
and improper maintenance given to the machine by Defendant. 
(See Point IB, infra.). With or without a policy on 
repairs, maintenance was the responsibility of Defendant 
and the damages caused from the failure to maintain are 
also the responsibility of Defendant. 
3. Express Terms Control Custom and Usage. 
The Defendant argues at length that somehow industry 
custom and usage changes and modifies the express duty of 
the lessee so that the responsibility of repairing the 
backhoe is placed on the lessor. This argument ignores 
the fact that under Utah law, express terms of a contract 
-10-
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control over testimony regarding custom and usage. Section 
70A-l-2~5, Utah Code Annotated (1953) provides in relevant 
part: 
The express terms of an agreement and 
an applicable course of dealing or usage of 
trade shall be construed wherever reasonable 
as consistent with each other; but when such 
construction is unreasonable express terms 
control both course of dealing and usage of 
trade and course of dealing controls usage 
of trade. [E~phasis added] 
In construing this Section of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, the courts have uniformly held that Section 70A-l-205 
only permits trade usages and dealings between the parties 
to supplement or give meaning to particular terms of a 
contract when it is reasonable and there is no inconsistency 
between the express terms of the contract and the interpre-
tation based upon custom or usage. Where there is any 
inconsistency between custom and usage and the express 
contract terms, the contract must control. See, ~, 
Colorado Bank & Trust Co. v. Western Slope Invest., Inc., 
539 P.2d 501, 503 (Colo. App. 1975); Corenswet, Inc. v. 
Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 549 F.2d 129, 136 (5th Cir. 
1979); Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Texas Sulphur Co., 508 F.2d 
283 (7th Cir., 1974). 
In the instant case, the express terms of the contract 
clearly placed the duty to repair upon the lessee and the 
contract terms are, therefore, controlling over any testimony 
of custom and usage by the Defendant's putative experts. 
It is also well settled that the Defendant bears the 
burden of proving the custom and usage in an industry by 
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clear evidence which must not be uncertain or contradicted. 
Martin v. Whiteley, 405 P.2d 963 (Idaho 1965). See also, 
Radio Station KFH Co. v. Musicians Ass'n., 169 Kan. 596, 220 
P.2d 199, 205 (1953). It is also well established that the 
custom or general practice in an industry must be established 
by the opinion of a properly qualified expert who knows and 
testifies to the general practices in his field. Trimball 
v. Coleman Co., 200 Kan. 350, 437 P.2d 219 (1968). In 
Trimball, the court rejected testimony by witnesses as to 
their individual practices which was offered to establish 
the general practice in the field. As a general proposi-
tion, the courts have been unwilling to accept the testimony 
of what one individual or one company did as constituting 
sufficient evidence of a custom or trade usage. See for 
example, Coury Bros. Ranches, Inc. v. Ellsworth, 103 Ariz. 
515, 446 P.2d 458, 464 (1968). Over the objection, (Tr. 
662, 666) and continuing objection, (Tr. 680) of the Plantiffs, 
a Mr. Babcock, called as the Defendant's expert, was permitted 
to testify concerning his understanding of such industry 
custom and usage as to duty to repair, as was the Defendant's 
principal officer, Mr. Tuft. (Tr. 801-802). The flaw in 
the position of the Defendant was and is that neither 
Mr. Babcock nor Mr. Tuft were lessors or dealers of con-
struction equipment, but, in fact, were users and customers 
of dealers. No foundation was ever laid with respect to 
their knowledge of industry standards other than as lessees. 
(Tr. 652, 654-655, 796-798, 801-802). No lessor or witness 
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from the equipment leasing industry was called or testified 
as to any industry standard, custom or usage with respect to 
the assumption of the duty to repair leased equipment by the 
lessor thereof. Even Mr. Babcock admitted that the handling 
of problems and repairs can be matters of negotiation between 
lessors and lessees. (Tr. 731). 
In the instant case, the Defendant attempted to contra-
dict the clear and unequivocal language in the lease regarding 
the duty to repair by introducing opinion testimony by 
unqualified witnesses as to their individual understanding 
of the custom in the industry. It is questionable in the 
first instance whether such evidence was even properly 
admissible. Such testimony is also in direct conflict with 
the testimony of Mr. Wienke that the items of repair under 
dispute were not items of ordinary wear and tear. (Tr. 415-
146). It cannot be disputed, however, that the jury which 
heard and considered Defendant's evidence rejected it. 
B. THE DEFENDANT IS LIABLE FOR THE REPAIRS PERFORMED 
EVEN UNDER DEFENDANT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE LEASE. 
Defendant argues that the lessor is responsible for 
repairs unless the problem was caused by operator abuse or 
negligence of the lessee. (Appellant's Brief at 26-30). 
All three of the major problems with the backhoe were 
caused by operator abuse or negligence of the Defendant. 
1. Hydraulic System Problems. 
When Mr. Baldwin was dispatched to the Alpine job 
site, he personally observed the "red" condition in the 
sight glass. (Tr. 317). He pulled the 25 micron filter 
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and described what he observed firsthand. (Tr. 317). The 
filter was "completely packed on both sides and layers at 
least an inch to two inches thick on the bottom of metal 
filings." (Tr. 317). The filings were brass and silver 
in color. Mr. Baldwin showed the filter to Mr. Tuft and 
Mr. Bowers. (Tr. 318). Even the Defendant's witnesses 
admitted that by the time metal filings are found in the 
filter, the damage to the machine necessitating complete 
decontamination of the hydraulic system had already occurred. 
(Tr. 703); (See also, Mr. Wienke's testimony Tr. 451). 
In an effort to explain the design of the backhoe and 
particularly the hydraulic system, the Plaintiffs called 
as an expert witness Mr. Charles Wienke. Mr. Wienke was 
the chief engineer for American Hoist and Derrick Co., the 
manufacturer of the backhoe, and was responsible for the 
actual design of the American Model 35 Backhoe, which is 
the subject of this case. (Tr. 390). Mr. Wienke explained 
in detail the design of the hydraulic system, its component 
parts and particularly the warm-up procedures that must be 
followed by the operator of the backhoe. (Tr. 392-394). 
According to Mr. Wienke, the contamination of the 
hydraulic system could occur as a result of five possible 
causes. The first is in the manufacture of the backhoe 
itself. In that process some very fine metallic particles 
can find their way into the machine's system. (Tr. 406). 
These particles are filtered out of the machine after the 
first 100 hours of operation. (Tr. 406). The subject 
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backhoe had approximately 2,000 hours of time in operation 
and the-contamination from that source in this case can be 
ruled out. Also, those particles are so small they cannot 
be seen in the filter (Tr. 407) and certainly those particles 
are not of the type described by Mr. Baldwin. (Tr. 317). 
The second possible cause of contamination was damage 
to the boom and cylinder in the operation of the backhoe. 
such admittedly occurred on the Wellington job when the 
Defendant scraped the side of a trench box and fractured 
one of the hydraulic lines. (Tr. 486). Mr. Healey testified 
that such was the Defendant's "fault" and that the line 
was replaced by the Defendant. (Tr. 486). By reason of 
the passage of time from June of 1978 until the contamination 
of the backhoe at Alpine in the Fall of 1978, the contamina-
tion as the result of that occurrence seems at best remote. 
It is noted, however, that even under the Defendant's 
position, the Defendant would be liable for repairs to the 
backhoe necessitated by the Defendant's admitted negligence 
in the operation of the backhoe. 
The third possible cause of the contamination could 
be the failure of the Defendant to properly oil the backhoe. 
(Tr. 399). Even Mr. Babcock, the Defendant's expert, 
placed that responsibility on the Defendant. (Tr. 731). 
With respect to the oil, Mr. Wienke testified at length 
concerning its specifications and that the manufacturer 
specified the use of a mineral-based oil with a certain 
viscosity (Tr. 401) and testified that a non-mineral based 
-15-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
oil sometimes results in an improper mixture. (Tr. 402). 
In all events, the oil added to the machine must be filtered 
through a 10 micron filter to remove impurities and contamina-
tion from its container (Tr. 400). The Defendant was 
unable to present any evidence as to the type of oil added 
to the machine, but admitted without qualification that 
the required 10 micron filter was not used. (Tr. 530). 
If the contamination came from that source, it is clear 
that such was the fault of the Defendant, which had the 
responsibility to add proper oil to the backhoe. The 
contaminated oil cause can be eliminated if the filters 
are not clogged and are working properly. (Tr. 436). 
According to Mr. Baldwin, the same were clogged and were 
not working properly. (Tr. 319). 
The fourth possible cause was the failure of the 
Defendant to follow proper warm-up procedures. Mr. Wienke 
testified that if the appropriate warm-up procedures are 
not followed a "cavitation condition" is caused, which in 
essence creates a vacuum in certain pumps in the machine, 
the result of which is that metal particles are pulled out 
of the pumps themselves and into the machine's hydraulic 
oil and system. (Tr. 394). The machine is designed to 
remove impurities from the hydraulic oil through a filteration 
process. It is clear, however, that the damage to the 
machine has been done before the oil with metal particles 
reaches the filter via the storage tank where proper warm-
up procedures are not followed. (Tr. 703). Mr. Wienke 
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summarized his conclusion as follows: "When you see the 
metal filings, you have already failed the pump." (Tr. 
451). 
It should be noted that Mr. Baldwin discussed with 
Mr. Bowers, a supervisory employee of the Defendant, the 
warm-up procedures to be followed (Tr. 285) and at all 
times the Defendant had the operating manual for the 
machine [Ex. D-36), although the Defendant's operator 
admitted he had never read it. (Tr. 553). 
The final possible cause was the failure to change 
filters in the machine as required and needed. It is 
undisputed that the filters on the machine should have 
been changed under normal working conditions of between 
300 and 500 machine operating hours or more often if 
conditions required. (Tr. 414). Perhaps the best and 
most accurate statement of the cause of the hydraulic 
system contamination on this machine was stated by Mr. 
Wienke. Mr. Wienke testified that " ••• if the filters 
would have been changed on time and kept clean, you wouldn't 
have got those metal filings in the filter." (Tr. 415). 
Mr. Wienke further testified that contamination or permitting 
the condition of contamination to occur is not "normal 
wear and tear on the machine." (Tr. 415). 
Defendant's own witness admitted that the changing of 
filters was the responsibility of the Defendant. (Tr. 
563, 610 and 663) The evidence at the trial was overwhelming 
that the required 25 micron filter as designed and used in 
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the backhoe could be purchased only from an authorized 
dealer.· (Tr. 396). It is undisputed that Shurtleff and 
Andrews and the Plaintiffs are the sole dealers in the 
State of Utah. (Tr. 396). Mr. Lester reviewed twice 
during the course of the trial the files and records of 
Shurtleff & Andrews and American Sales Company and was 
unable to verify the purchase of any filter by the Defendant. 
(Tr. 958). The Defendant was unable to verify the purchase 
of a filter from any source during the course of the lease 
term. While it is clear that under optimum conditions the 
25 micron filter should have been changed at least three 
times during the term of the lease, in fact, the record is 
devoid of any evidence of a filter change by the Defendant 
after the backhoe left the Decker Lake job. (Tr. 563 and 
578). Under the state of the evidence, the jury could not 
only reasonably infer but had no alternative other than to 
conclude that the filters in the machine were not changed 
timely. 
2. Axle Problems. 
After the backhoe was delivered to the Murray job, an 
axle on the machine was broken. The axle was replaced by 
the Plaintiff without charge to the Defendant. A second 
axle was broken on the Wellington job and it cannot be 
determined whether that axle was the new axle or not. 
(Tr. 377). It is clear, however, that the breaking of 
parts, including an axle, is not normal wear and tear. 
(Tr. 415). 
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The testimony at the trial was that there are two 
causes of axle breakage. (Tr. 348-349, 356). The first 
is undue stress being placed on an axle. Mr. Baldwin, who 
replaced the axle, testified that he observed a twisting 
effect in the sheared axle on the Wellington job (Tr. 
363). The evidence is clear and unrebutted that the 
Defendant operated the backhoe on both the Murray and 
Wellington jobs while one axle was broken. Incredible as 
it seems, the Defendant operated this 42-ton machine using 
only one track and "limping" the machine along rather than 
shutting it down for repairs. This practice was rejected 
by the designer of the machine, Mr. Wienke (Tr. 402), by 
Mr. Baldwin (Tr. 289, 298, 299), and even by Mr. Williams, 
the Defendant's own mechanic. (Tr. 591). The testimony 
was further uncontradicted that such constituted improper 
maintenance. (Tr. 348). There was ample evidence for the 
jury to find that such constituted negligence on the part 
of the Defendant or operator abuse. 
The second cause of axle failure can result from 
debris, rocks and mud caught in the tumbler and sprocket 
portion of the machine's track assembly. (Tr. 297, 417). 
Mr. Baldwin testified concerning the heavy, muddy conditions 
in which the machine was being operated on the Wellington 
job. He testified that he and Mr. Woods had to clean the 
machine with prybar-type instruments. (Tr. 297). Mr. 
Baldwin further testified that it was the operation of the 
backhoe in conditions such as he observed on the Wellington 
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job without removing the rocks and debris that constituted 
improper operation and abuse. (Tr. 298). Mr. Wienke 
verified that operating the backhoe under such conditions 
could cause an axle to break even on a new machine. (Tr. 
417). 
There was more than sufficient evidence for the jury 
to conclude that the cause of the axle breakage was improper 
operation and abuse. 
3. Charging System Problems. 
In Point I the Defendant argues at length that it was 
improperly charged for repairs to the charging system of 
the backhoe on the Wellington project. For a period of 
five (5) days, the Defendant started this machine by 
"jumping" the spark from a 12-volt pickup truck to a 24-
volt backhoe. (Tr. 510). The evidence was uncontradicted 
that such a practice is highly improper. Mr. Wienke 
testified that you simply don't do it that way. (Tr. 416, 
432). In fact, his testimony was that the pickup batteries 
would not charge the backhoe batteries. (Tr. 434). To 
trained construction people such as those in the Defendant's 
employ, it should have been patently obvious after five 
(5) days that their "makeshift" starting system was not 
working. Mr. Baldwin testified that if such a procedure 
were employed improperly in terms of the hook-up, the 
charging system could be seriously damaged. (Tr. 384). 
The problem was serious enough that separate mechanics 
were called in to remedy and repair the problem. [Ex. D-
8]. There was not only sufficient, but virtually uncontradictec 
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testimony from which the jury could find and did find that 
those charges were properly assessed against the Defendant. 
C. THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT THE MECHANICS 
WERE COMPETENT AND FOLLOWI:D PROPER 
PROCEDURES IN REPAIRING THE BACKHOE. 
The Defendant argues in Point I (1) of its Brief that 
the mechanics who repaired the backhoe were incompetent 
because (1) Ray Baldwin should have checked the main 
hydraulic filter earlier, and (2) Ray Baldwin did not 
follow proper procedures in decontaminating the hydraulic 
system. Such assertions have no basis and cannot be 
supported by the evidence in this case. 
The attack of the Defendant is directed primarily to 
the competency of Mr. Baldwin, one of the mechanics who 
worked on the backhoe. Mr. Baldwin had been employed as 
a mechanic for a period of approximately eighteen (18) 
years. His experience included work on all types of heavy 
equipment in Utah and elsewhere. (Tr. 280-281, 379-380). 
Most importantly, Mr. Baldwin was the mechanic who actually 
worked on the subject backhoe, observed its condition 
first hand and made repairs thereto. 
It is noted at the outset that the Defendant was not 
reguired to use mechanics suggested by the Plaintiffs. 
The Defendant was free to use any mechanic to "keep the 
equipment in good repair and condition." (Tr. 90); [Ex. 
P-1). It is undisputed that during the course of the 
lease term, the Defendant utilized the services of its own 
mechanics and service personnel. Interestingly enough, the 
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record is devoid of any objection or complaint filed or made 
by the Defendant to the Plaintiffs with respect to Mr. Baldwi~ 
mechanical competence or lack thereof prior to the institution 
of suit in this case. 
Mr. Baldwin did not have the duty to check the main 
hydraulic filter visual indicator and to make other inspec-
tions of the backhoe. Those duties were assumed by the 
Defendant and each of its witnesses so testified. (Tr. 
563, 610, 663, 528-31, 551; Respondent's Brief at 20, 
supra). The job of the mechanic is to locate the specific 
problem and get the machine back in operating condition as 
fast as possible. (Tr. 321, 450). In any case, once the 
filings are in the filter, the damage is already done. 
(Tr. 451, 703). 
The Defendant's second complaint is that Mr. Baldwin 
did not follow proper procedures in the repair and decontamination 
of the backhoe's hydraulic system. Mr. Wienke listened to 
the testimony of Mr. Baldwin with respect to the procedures 
followed by Mr. Baldwin and concluded that the procedure 
followed by Mr. Baldwin was acceptable. (Tr. 420). 
D. DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO 
JOIN A REAL PARTY IN INTEREST WAS PROPERLY DENIED. 
At the close of Plaintiffs' case in chief, the Defendant, 
for the first time, moved for a dismissal of Plaintiffs' 
claim for cost of repairs on the basis that the claim had not 
been prosecuted by the real party in interest pursuant to 
Rule 17, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendant claims 
that since the repairs were performed by mechanics from 
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Shurtleff and Andrews, the action for recovery of such 
repair costs should properly come from Shurtleff and Andrews. 
After considering the Defendant's oral motion made in open 
court, the trial court ruled that there was sufficient 
evidence from which the jury could find that a contract for 
the payment of the repairs existed between Plaintiffs and 
Defendant. Accordingly, the motion was denied. (Tr. 479). 
The only conceivable basis of Defendant's Motion arises 
from the procedure by which repairs were ordered and made by 
the parties. The testimony at trial established that whenever 
Defendant required repairs it notified the Plaintiffs, 
specifying the nature of the problem. Since Plaintiffs 
employed no mechanics of its own, it would request the services 
of mechanics employed by Shurtleff and Andrews. (Tr. 25). 
Accordingly, an order for repairs would be sent from Plaintiffs 
to Shurtleff and Andrews and the latter would dispatch its 
mechanics at Plaintiffs' direction. (Tr. 25). A statement 
would be calculated and a bill sent from Shurtleff and Andrews 
to Plaintiffs for the services rendered. (Tr. 25, 35-36). 
Plaintiffs would then, in turn, bill Defendant for the 
repairs. [Exs. D-8 and D-9). 
At no time did Shurtleff and Andrews send statements to 
or demand payment from the Defendant for the repairs. In 
every case Shurtleff and Andrews billed Plaintiffs. (See, 
e.g., Ex. D-8). Shurtleff and Andrews recognized that 
Plaintiffs had requested the mechanics and, therefore, 
Plaintiffs, not Defendant, was responsible for the charges. 
(Tr. 25). 
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If the requested repairs required specialized training, 
Plaintiffs retained the services of other repairmen, such as 
Abbott GM Diesel, Inc. Abbott also billed Plaintiffs directly, 
(Tr. 68-69); [Ex. D-8]. This procedure was followed through-
out the lease term and the Defendant paid certain of Plaintifh' 
statements without objection or comment. (Tr. 193) [Ex. P-
20]. 
1. Timeliness of Motion. 
The timing of Defendant's Motion is, at best, highly 
questionable. The Defendant knew from the outset that Plaintiffs 
employed the services of Shurtleff and Andrews to make the 
necessary repairs. No claim can or has been made that these 
facts were a surprise to the Defendant. However, contrary to 
the allegations of the Defendant, this issue was not raised, 
expressly or by implication, by the Defendant either in its 
Answer or any subsequent pleading. 
It has long been the established rule of law that the 
failure of a party to timely raise an objection based upon 
Rule 17 in its Answer, or at the outset of the pleadings, 
acts as a waiver of the objection. This Court has affirmed 
the rule of law as above summarized on two prior occasions. 
In Fritz v. Western Union Tel. Co., 25 Utah 263, 71 P. 
209 (1903), the Defendant raised an objection as to the real 
party in interest at trial. This Court, in its ruling, 
stated: 
[T]his objection was urged too late, and must 
be held to have been waived. "The objection 
that the plaintiff in an action is not the 
real party in interest • • • when available 
-24-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
by way of defense, must be raised by demurrer 
or answer, or it will be considered to have 
been waived." Id. at 214 (Emphasis added) 
In the subsequent case of Tooele Meat & Storage Co. v. Fite 
Candy Co., 57 Utah 1, 168 P. 427 (1917), this Court, dealing 
with a defense of lack of standing, related the same to a 
motion for failure to prosecute in the name of a real party 
in interest, holding: 
Such an objection is like one that the 
plaintiff is not the real party in interest. 
That objection must be made by special 
demurrer if it appears on the face of the 
complaint, and, if it does not so appear, 
then advantage of it must be taken by answer, 
and if not taken either by answer or demurrer 
the objection is waived. Id. at 428. 
(Emphasis added). 
See also, Parker v. Brown, 4 Cal. 2d 344, 254 P.2d 6 (1953). 
The timing of Defendant's Motion indicates that it is 
nothing more than a thinly-disguised attempt by Defendant 
to bootstrap itself into an argument for dismissal. Defendant 
has known from the very outset of this litigation that 
Plaintiffs, when requested by Defendant to repair the 
backhoe, would employ the services of mechanics from Shurtleff 
and Andrews and others. Defendant was fully aware that no 
monthly billings were sent by Shurtleff and Andrews to 
Defendant but that all statements were sent to Plaintiffs. 
[See Exs. D-8 and D-9]. 
That the Defendant never considered the possibility 
that it owed Shurtleff and Andrews for the repairs, rather 
than Plaintiffs, is also apparent. At no time did Defendant 
express any concern about the identity of the company 
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entitled to be paid for the repairs. Mr. Tuft, the principal 
officer-of the Defendant, testified that he had a number of 
conversations with Plaintiffs regarding both the rental 
payments and the repair payments on the backhoe, but not 
once did Mr. Tuft raise a question as to whom payment 
should be made. (Tr. 845). 
Not even when the Defendant was served with a Summons 
and Complaint seeking recovery of the repair costs did the 
Defendant raise an issue as to whether the wrong entity was 
demanding payment. Defendant's Amended Answer and Counter-
claim (R. 151) filed barely one month prior to trial, 
contains nothing more than the customary boilerplate Motion 
to Dismiss for failure to state a claim. Defendant's 
Answers to Interrogatories add little other than an allega-
tion that Shurtleff and Andrews might also be liable to the 
Defendant since Shurtleff and Andrews provided the labor 
and parts. (R. 159). If Defendant seriously believed 
Shurtleff and Andrews was responsible under the Counterclaim, 
one wonders why Shurtleff and Andrews was never brought into 
this action by the Defendant. 
It is further noteworthy that Defendant in its Motion 
was concerned only with Shurtleff and Andrews and not with 
other repairmen such as Abbott GM Diesel, Inc. Defendant 
knew that Plaintiffs had hired Abbott to repair the charging 
system, just as Plaintiffs had hired Shurtleff and Andrews 
to accomplish other repairs. 
The simple fact remains that Defendant did not timely 
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raise its objection under Rule 17. Under the clear facts 
established at trial, the Motion of Defendant was improper; 
is deemed waived and was properly denied by the trial 
court. 
2. Real Party in Interest. 
The trial court correctly ruled that since there was 
sufficient evidence to find that a contract to pay for the 
repairs existed between the parties, Defendant's Motion 
should be denied. 
A real party in interest is defined by the case law as 
any party who actually owns the cause of action and is in a 
position to release the claim once satisfied. In Anheuser-
Busch, Inc. v. Starley, 28 Cal. 2d 347, 170 P.2d 448, the 
California Supreme Court noted: 
Where plaintiff shows such title that a 
judgment satisfied by the defendant will 
protect defendant from future annoyance or 
loss, and defendant can urge any defenses he 
could make against the real owner, the action 
is being prosecuted in the name of the •real 
party in interest." Id. at 449. 
The Supreme Court of New Mexico in State v. Barker, 51 
N.M. 51, 178 P.2d 401, held that the existence of a real 
party in interest depends on: 
••• (1) whether he is the owner of the 
right to be enforced; or (2) whether he is in 
a position to release and discharge defendant 
from liability on which action is grounded. 
Id. at 402. 
It has further been noted that the ownership of the claim 
must be substantive and not simply technical or nominal. 
Maryland Casualty Co. v. King, 381 P.2d 153 (Okl. 1963). 
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The purpose of the rule is to allow a party to assert 
all available defenses against the real owner of the cause 
of action, thereby being allowed a full hearing on the 
merits of the controversy. Shaw v. Jeppson, 121 Utah 155, 
239 P.2d 745 (1952). 
In the case at bar the evidence clearly indicates that 
Plaintiffs are a real party in interest to this litigation. 
Plaintiffs were the party with whom Defendant contracted 
for the lease of the backhoe. (Tr. 834-35); [Ex. P-1). It 
was the Plaintiffs that Defendant would call if the machine 
needed repairs. (Tr. 24). It was Plaintiffs that requested 
mechanics from Shurtleff and Andrews and others. The 
mechanics were dispatched under the direction of Plaintiffs 
and the services rendered were billed by Shurtleff and 
Andrews, not to Defendant, but to Plaintiffs. (Tr. 25-26). 
Plaintiffs would then see that the bill was paid to Shurtleff 
and Andrews, expecting to be paid in turn by the Defendant 
according to the clear terms of the lease agreement. (Tr. 
35-36) 
The Defendant was free to, and did at trial, raise 
every conceivable defense, including breach of all warranties. 
Defendant was not foreclosed from raising the issues of the 
value of the services performed and whether the repairs 
were accomplished in a workmanlike manner. In fact, Defendant 
spent much of the time eliciting evidence in support of 
those defenses. 
Under the circumstances of this case it is clear that 
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the purpose of the Rule has been satisfied. Defendant has 
not claimed that the failure to join Shurtleff and Andrews 
deprived it of some important defense. Nor has it been 
shown that Shurtleff and Andrews would or could raise some 
action against Defendant since the orders for service came 
from Plaintiffs and were for Plaintiffs' backhoe. 
E. PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT UNJUSTLY ENRICHED. 
Defendant's claim that the enforcement of the judgment 
will result in unjust enrichment of the Plaintiffs' almost 
requires no response. Plaintiffs' action was for the 
recovery of unpaid rental payments for the use of the 
backhoe during the lease term and repairs to the backhoe 
occasioned by the Defendant's use of the backhoe. Plaintiffs 
are not asking for double payment or for any recovery not 
specifically provided for in the lease agreement. [Ex. P-
l]. Plaintiffs simply seek to be reimbursed for the use and 
repair of the backhoe and nothing else. 
In order to support a claim of unjust enrichment, the 
Defendant must show that the Plaintiffs have received a 
benefit which does not belong to them. In Baugh v. Darley, 
112 Utah 1, 184 P.2d 335, 337 (1947), this Court ruled 
that: 
Unjust enrichment of a person occurs when he 
has and retains money or benfits which in 
justice and equity belong to another. 
(Emphasis added) 
The clear application of this rule of law is that the 
Plaintiffs cannot be unjustly enriched for simply receiving 
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the benefit of their bargain under the lease. Plaintiffs 
leased a backhoe to Defendant in return for Defendant's 
promise that Plaintiffs would be paid for each day of 
Defendant's use. [Ex. P-1]. The jury awarded to Plaintiffs 
the unpaid lease payments which Defendant agreed to pay for 
the use of the backhoe, nothing more and nothing less. 
In like manner, Plaintiffs asked only to be reimbursed 
for the cost of repairs to maintain the backhoe pursuant to 
the lease. Contrary to the position of Defendant, the jury 
found from the evidence that Defendant was obligated to 
repair the backhoe and that the charges for such repairs 
were reasonable. 
Defendant's argument that the lease payment included a 
reserve for repairs is simply not supported by the evidence. 
The testimony of Mr. Carson was to the effect that he used 
certain standard publications in assisting him to set a 
lease rate. (Tr. 7-8). The undisputed evidence as presented 
at trial is that had the lease rate included a reserve for 
repairs, the lease payment would have been substantially 
higher than the amount which the Defendant was required to 
pay. (Tr. 83-84). In fact, the testimony of Mr. Carson 
was that the Plaintiffs did not offer a lease which included 
a reserve for repairs and that during the negotiations with 
the Defendant, Mr. Tuft was told that he would be responsible 
for the maintenance and repairs on the backhoe. (Tr. 12-
13). Accordingly, there was never any direct evidence that 
the lease in question [Ex. P-1] contained a specific reserve, 
in a specified, indentifiable amount, for repairs during 
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The argument of Defendant is clearly without merit and 
in error. Plaintiffs have only been made whole by the jury 
award in this case and have received no windfall by enforcement 
of the judgment. Under these circumstances, the claim of 
unjust enrichment is improper and must fail. 
POINT II 
RAY BALDWIN'S EXPERT OPINION WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED. 
Defendant argues in Point II of its Brief that the trial 
court erred in permitting Ray Baldwin to give his expert 
opinion that the backhoe had not been properly maintained. 
Defendant does not dispute Mr. Baldwin's qualifications 
as an expert, Defendant merely asserts that the foundation for 
his opinion was inadequate because he had never observed nor 
did he have personal knowledge of any specific acts by Defendant 
which would constitute improper maintenance. Obviously, if 
Mr. Baldwin had actually observed or had personal knowledge of 
improper maintenance of the backhoe, it would not have been 
necessary for him to give an opinion. The purpose of allowing 
expert opinion testimony is to permit an expert with special 
knowledge or training to draw inferences or conclusions from 
facts perceived by, known or made known to him, which the 
jury, without such special knowledge or training, would not be 
able to draw for themselves. This general rule was expressed 
in Gilbert v. Quinet, 369 P.2d 267, 268 (Ariz. 1962): 
An expert may be allowed, in cases where 
expert opinion is appropriate, to interpret 
facts in evidence which the jury are not 
qualified to interpret for themselves, McCormick, 
Evidence § 13, p. 28 (1954). 
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An argument similar to that made by Defendant was 
asserted and rejected in Boehler v. Sanders, 404 P.2d 885, 
887 (Mont. 1968): 
According to appellant's argument and 
the cases cited alleging support of his 
theory, a policy officer, who qualifies as 
an expert in traffic matters, cannot give 
opinion testimony based on his investigation 
if he did not witness the accident. Such is 
not the law for he can give an opinion based 
on the facts he testified to •.•• Appellant's 
objection to this testimony was "that it 
called for a conclusion and that no proper 
foundation was laid." This objection was 
properly overruled by the trial judge, 
Admittedly, the expert witness must testify as to the 
facts upon which his opinion is based (Day v. Lorenzo Smith 
& Son, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 221, 408 P.2d 221 (1965) ); however, 
Mr. Baldwin did testify extensively as to the facts upon 
which his opinion was based. Mr. Baldwin testified that he 
had performed the final servicing on the backhoe immediately 
prior to the lease to Defendant (Tr. 282) and that during 
the term of that lease, he inspected and repaired the 
backhoe on numerous occasions. (Tr. 282, 286-292, 293-298, 
300-310, 313-315, 317-321). Mr. Baldwin further testified 
that during the course of repairs performed at the Alpine 
project, he removed the main hydraulic filter and found 
that it was totally contaminated. (Tr. 317). 
After approximately forty (40) pages of testimony, 
including that testimony cited above, Mr. Baldwin was 
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asked, based on his inspection and the work he performed on 
the machine, to give his judgment as to whether the machine 
had been maintained in a proper condition. (Tr. 321) .• He 
stated that " •.• [i]n my opinion, when I pulled that 
filter out, there was no way the machine was maintained 
properly." (Tr. 323). 
The admissibility of expert testimony such as Mr. 
Baldwin's is generally left to the discretion of the trial 
court and this court has so held. Batt v. State, 28 Utah 
2d 417, 503 P.2d 855, 858 (1972). 
The admissibility of such testimony is 
primarily for the trial court to determine. 
He is allowed considerable latitude of 
discretion; and this court will not reverse 
in the absence of clear showing of abuse; but 
will leave the challenge to its reliability 
as going not to its competency, but as to its 
weight and credibility, which is for the jury 
to determine. 
After reviewing the foundation for Mr. Baldwin's 
opinion, there can be no question that the trial court did 
not err or abuse its discretion in allowing this testimony. 
Even assuming that it was error to admit this testimony, it 
does not rise to the level of a prejudicial error which 
would warrant reversal. 
Defendant contends that this alleged error was prejudicial 
because ". [n]o other witness testified the backhoe was 
maintained improperly and there is no other testimony in 
the record in the form of expert opinion directly supporting 
a jury finding there was operator abuse or improper maintenance 
of the machine insofar as the hydraulic system was concerned.• 
(Appellant's Brief at 36-37). 
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This contention ignores the testimony of Mr. Weinke 
that " •. • (i]f the filters would have been changed on 
time and kept clean, you wouldn't have got those metal 
filings in the filters." (Tr. 415). Defendant's own 
witness, Mr. Babcock, testified that the replacement of 
filters is the responsibility of the contractor or lessee. 
(Tr. 663). Mr. Weinke also testified that hydraulic oil 
added to the backhoe should " ••. pass ..• through a ten 
micron filter before it goes into the machine." (Tr. 400). 
Defendant's employees admit that this was not done. (Tr. 
530). 
Under similar circumstances, this Court held in 
Christianson v. Debry, 23 Utah 2d 334, 463 P.2d 5 (1969), 
that even if the trial court erred in admitting certain 
expert opinion testimony, where there was other evidence to 
support the verdict, the admission was harmless error. 
POINT III 
EXPERT TESTIMONY IS NOT REQUIRED IN DETERMINING 
MERCHANTABILITY AND THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT 
COMMIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN FINDING 
HAROLD BABCOCK UNQUALIFIED. 
In Point III of its brief, the Defendant argues that 
the question of the merchantable condition of the backhoe 
"must come from expert witnesses •.• " and that the 
exclusion of Harold Babcock's opinion as to the merchanta-
bility of the backhoe "was prejudicial since it left 
defendants [sic] without the required testimony on this 
critical issue • • (Appellant's Brief at 38 and 41) 
(Emphasis added). 
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!tnr 
Plaintiff does not dispute that expert opinion evidence 
on the ~ssue of merchantability may be considered by the 
jury provided that the witness is properly qualified and 
testifies as to matters within his realm of special knowledge 
and that the trial judge determines that such opinion 
evidence will assist the jury. Christopher v. Larson Ford 
Sales, 557 P.2d 1009 (Utah 1976); Hooper v. General Motors 
Corp., 123 Utah 515, 260 P.2d 549 (1953). However, the 
Defendant argues that such evidence is reguired and must 
be introduced to discharge its burden of proving a product 
defect. Contrary to the Defendant's assertion, the courts 
have consistently held that expert testimony is not required. 
In Lucas v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 458 F.2d 495, 497 
(1972), the Fifth Circuit Stated: 
"There is no burden on plaintiff to prove a 
specific defect by an expert witness as 
distinguished from other proof. The fact of 
a malfunction and also of a defect may be 
proven by direct or circumstantial evidence." 
In Burrus v. Itek Corp., 46 Ill. App. 3d 350, 360 
N.E.2d 1168 (1977), the Illinois court in construing § 2-
314 of the Illinois Uniform Commercial Code, which is 
identical to § 70A-2-314 of the Utah statute, rejected the 
argument that expert testimony is required: 
The defendant, while citing no 
authority, nevertheless argues strongly 
that specific defects • • • must be 
proven by expert testimony. With this 
contention we disagree for no mention of 
specific defects is found in the test of 
a breach of implied warranty of merchan-
tability in our Commercial Code. 
The large number of cases in which non-expert, non-
opinion, direct and circumstantial evidence has been admitted 
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to demonstrate unmerchantability clearly show that there is 
no requirement to introduce expert opinion testimony. See, 
~, Guardian Ins. Co. v. Anacostia Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 
320 A.2d 315 (D.C. App. 1974); Codling v. Paglia, 38 App. 
Div. 2d 154, 327 N.Y.S. 2d 978 (1972); Colorado Serum Co. 
v. Arp, 504 P.2d 801 (Wyo. 1972); 31 Am. Jur. 2d "Expert 
and Opinion Evidence" §19. 
In this case, the trial court sustained an objection 
to the question seeking Mr. Babcock's opinion as to the 
merchantability of the backhoe on the grounds of lack of 
proper qualification. Judge Sawaya stated, "I think 
that's [referring to merchantability] something that this 
gentleman is not qualified to answer." (Tr. 670). (Emphasis 
added). The requisite test of proper testimony by an 
expert witness is outlined in Rule 56(2) of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence which states: 
If the witness is testifying as an 
expert, testimony of the witness in the 
form of opinions or inferences is limited 
to such opinions as the judge finds are 
(a) based on facts or data perceived by or 
personally known or made known to the 
witness at the hearing and (b) within the 
scope of the special knowledge, skill, 
experience or training possessed by the 
witness. 
The Defendant argues that Mr. Babcock's training as an 
engineer and his experience as a general contractor who 
purchased parts qualifies him as an expert as to merchanta-
bility. In order to conclude that the backhoe was unmerchantable, 
Mr. Babcock would have to find that the mechanical problems 
experienced by the backhoe were caused by defects existing in 
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the backhoe at the time the lease commenced, rather than by 
some intervening cause such as operator abuse. The record 
contains not one item of evidence that Mr. Babcock had any 
special knowledge, skill, experience or training as a mechanic 
which would enable him to reach a conclusion as to the cause 
of the problems. Defendant, in effect, is putting the cart 
before the horse by arguing that a user or lessee of machinery 
is an expert in such areas as design, and the local standard 
of merchantability. One could just as easily argue that a 
patient who had been treated with x-rays is competent to 
testify as an expert as to the local medical standard of x-
ray treatment. 
In discussing the questions of the qualifications of 
expert witnesses and the admissibility of their testimony, 
this Court has held that "(i]nherent in the position of the 
trial judge in the immediate control of the trial is the 
responsibility of passing upon whether the subject justifies 
expert testimony and the qualifications of the witness as to 
whether he can give sound and reliable help to the jury on 
it." Webb v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 9 Utah 2d 275, 
342 P.2d 1094, 1097 (1959). And, in passing on the standard 
of review, the Court stated, "The practical exigencies of the 
situation make it necessary that the trial court be allowed 
considerable latitude of discretion in making such determina-
tions. His rulings in that regard should not be disturbed 
lightly, nor at all unless it clearly appears that he was in 
error in his judgment on the matter." Id. This Court has 
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consistently held that the trial judge must be accorded wide 
discretion in determining the qualifications of experts and 
the admissibility of their testimony. See, e.g., Fillmore 
City v. Reeve, 571 P.2d 1316, 1319 (Utah 1977); Lamb v. 
Bangart, 525 P.2d 602, 607-608 (Utah 1974). The rule is 
supported by the sound policy that the trial judge who has the 
opportunity to observe the witness firsthand is in the best 
position to judge his expertise and the value of his testimony. 
As the rule has been stated in 31 Am. Jur. 2d "Expert & Opinion 
Evidence" §31: 
The trial court has the primary function 
to determine whether or not a witness is an 
expert or has sufficient knowledge to qualify 
as an expert. The determination of the 
competency and qualifications of a witness 
offered as an expert is addressed to the 
judicial discretion of the trial judge 
before whom the testimony is offered, and 
his ruling or determination in this respect 
with regard to the proposed expert witness 
will not be disturbed by a reviewing court, 
unless that discretion has been abused, or 
the error is clear and involves a miscon-
ception of the law, in which case the judg-
ment of the trial court may be reversed. 
In the instant case, the trial court had the opportunity 
to observe and question the expert and to hear the testimony 
regarding his qualifications firsthand. The court did not 
abuse his discretion because Mr. Babcock had not operated the 
backhoe, was not a mechanic, had never repaired the backhoe, 
did not inspect the backhoe while in the possession of the 
Defendant, was not a lessor of backhoes and did not receive a 
definition of "merchantability" upon which an opinion could be 
based. (Tr. 700-702). 
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It is fundamental that the competence of an expert must 
be relative to the topic about which he is asked to testify. 
See, e.g., Ziegler v. Crofoot, 516 P.2d 954, (Kan. 1973); 
Hodo v. Lox, 437 P.2d 249 (Okl. 1967); 31 Am. Jur. 2d S27, 
"Expert and Opinion Evidence" at 527. The trial judge in his 
discretion simply determined that Mr. Babcock did not possess 
the requisite knowledge and skill relating to the matter upon 
which he sought to testify. 
Even assuming, for purposes of argument, that Mr. Babcock 
had the necessary expertise, the Defendant must also show that 
the failure to receive his opinion into evidence resulted in 
prejudicial error. It is submitted that the question as to 
his opinion on merchantability was only one question in the 
course of a 9-day trial where the jury heard exhaustive evidence 
as to the question of merchantability and was necessarily 
aware of the Defendant's position. It is beyond credibility 
that the jury which heard and considered that evidence would 
change its position based upon Mr. Babcock's response to the 
objectionable question. 
POINT IV 
THE EXCLUSION OF EXHIBIT D-44 WHICH WAS MERELY A 
CUMULATIVE SUMMARY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE 
PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
In Point IV of its Brief, the Defendant argues that the 
trial judge committed prejudicial error in excluding Exhibit 
D-44 which was a summary prepared by Mrs. Tuft of the problems 
with the backhoe based upon Defendants' reports, invoices, 
telephone memoranda and the diary of Mr. Tuft. 
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It is fundamental that a party seeking to rely upon 
evidence must offer that evidence to the Court, which will 
then rcile upon its admissibility. Here, the Defendant attempt~ 
to offer Exhibit D-44 into evidence, but were met with objec-
tions as to proper foundation and hearsay. (Tr. 745-746). 
Contrary to the Defendant's assertion, the record is devoid of 
any evidence that a ruling was obtained on the admissibility 
of this Exhibit. Rather than rule on the Exhibit when it was 
first offered, the court instructed the Defendant to " 
offer it again in the morning and I'll rule on it." (Tr. 
747). There is no indication in the record that the Defendant 
offered it again. If Defendant had obtained a ruling in 
chambers to which the Defendant took exception, the Defendant 
should have preserved the record on this point. 
Even assuming arguendo that Exhibit D-44 was, in fact, 
offered and refused, the trial court's refusal to admit the 
Exhibit was proper. Plaintiffs fail to see the applicability 
of Rule 67 cited in Appellant's Brief at 44 which concerns 
ancient documents. It appears that in order for Exhibit D-44 
to be admissible, it must qualify as an exception to the 
hearsay rule under Rule 65(13) and as a proper summary with 
the meaning of Rule 70(l)(f). 
Rule 63(13) provides: 
(13) Business Entries and the Like. 
Writings offered as memoranda or records 
of acts, conditions or events to prove the 
facts stated therein, if t~c judge finds 
that they were made in tne regular course 
of a business at or about the time of the 
act, condition or event recorded, - j that 
the sources of information from whici, made 
and the method and circumstances of their 
preparation were such as to indicate their 
trustworthiness. 
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It is by no means clear that the sources from which 
Exhibit D-44 was prepared or "the method and circumstances 
of [its] preparation were such as to indicate their 
trustworthiness." To take but one example, portions of 
Exhibit D-44 were based upon Mr. Tuft's diaries. The 
trustworthiness of his diaries prepared only sporadically 
as he periodically visited various job sites was highly 
suspect and offered no assistance as to the cause of 
problems with the backhoe. In Buckley v. Altheimer, 152 
F.2d 502 (7th Cir. 1945), the Seventh Circuit held that 
private diaries were inadmissible as a business record 
exception to the hearsay rule. 
Even if Exhibit D-44 was properly admissible as an 
exception to the hearsay rule under Rule 63(13) and also 
had a proper foundation under Rule 70(l)(f), which the 
Plaintiffs deny, the Defendant must nevertheless show 
that its "exclusion" was prejudicial error. In Gull 
Laboratories, Inc. v. Louis A. Roser Co., 589 P.2d 756, 
759 (Utah 1978), this Court stated the following test of 
prejudicial error: 
Generally a jury verdict will only be upset 
where the error committed was so substantial 
and prejudicial that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the result would have been 
different in the absence of such error. Id. 
In the instant case, no such reasonable likelihood of a 
different result exists. Defendant offered Exhibit D-44 for 
the purpose of establishing that the backhoe had problems. 
Defendant admits in its Brief that Mrs. Tuft was permitted to 
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testify as to those problems and even used Exhibit D-44 to 
refresh·her memory. (Appellant's Brief at 44). Thus, at 
best, Exhibit D-44 was an unnecessary, cumulative summary of 
evidence which was received and considered by the jury. As 
such, the Exhibit was clearly excludable in the sound discre-
tion of the trial court under Rule 45 as being merely cumula-
tive and necessitating undue consumption of time. 
POINT V 
INSTRUCTIONS NUMBERED 25 AND 29 ARE CORRECT 
STATEMENTS OF THE LAW. 
The Defendant contends that the Trial Judge committed 
prejucidial error in giving the following instructions: 
Instruction No. 25 
In order for the Defendant to recover 
under a warranty of merchantability, the 
Defendant must prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence the following: 
1. That the Plaintiff leased a backhoe 
to the Defendant which was not merchantable 
at the time of the lease; and 
2. That the Defendant incurred damages; 
and 
3. That such damages were caused 
proximately and in fact by the defective 
nature of the backhoe; and 
4. That the Defendant notified Plaintiff 
of any breach of the warranty of merchantability 
within a reasonable time after the Defendant 
discovered or should have discovered any 
breach. [R. 368) 
Instruction No. 29 
In this case the burden of proof with 
respect to the applicability of the implied 
warranty of merchantability rests upon the 
Defendant to show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the backhoe was in a defective 
condition at the time the lease commenced on 
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March 21, 1977 and that there was no change 
in the mechanical condition of the backhoe 
from the time the lease commenced until such 
time as the backhoe experienced the mechanical 
difficulties in question. In the absence of 
proof of a defect in the backhoe on March 
21, 1977, the Plaintiff may not be held 
liable on a theory of implied warranty. [R. 
372] 
Defendant contends that these Instructions, which state 
in relevant part that the Defendant must prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the backhoe was not merchantable or was 
defective at the time the lease commenced, are an inaccurate 
statement of the law and they are in direct conflict with the 
last sentence of Instruction No. 27, requested by Defendant, 
which states that the " .•. implied warranty of merchantability 
attaches to the backhoe for each separate monthly term during 
which time the Equipment Lease Agreement was in effect." (R. 
370) 
Plaintiffs concede that there may be some inconsistency 
between Instruction Nos. 25 and 29 and Instruction No. 27, 
which Instruction seems to imply that each month is a separate 
lease term for which a new and distinct warranty of merchan-
tability arises. The Plaintiffs can find no authority or 
justification for the Defendant's "separate lease term" 
theory. On the contrary, the case law and commentators 
uniformly support the position that the warranty of merchan-
tability relates to the time of the sale, which in this case 
would be analogous to the date the lease commenced. 
White and Summers, well-recognized authorities on the 
Uniform Commercial Code, state in their treatise on the 
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subject, that a party seeking to recover on a warranty theory 
" ••• ~ust prove that the goods did not comply with the 
warranty, that is, that they were defective at the time of 
the sale • • [and) that his injury was caused, 'proximately' 
and in fact, by the defective nature of the goods ••. " 
White & Summers, Uniform Commercial Code (1972) at 272. 
Courts which have addressed this issue have consistently 
held that there can be no recovery under an implied warranty 
of merchantability unless it can be established that the 
injury complained of was caused by some defect in existence 
at the time of the sale or lease and not by some act or cause 
arising after delivery. 
For example, in Lucchesi v. H. C. Bohack Co. Inc., 8 UCC 
Reporting Service 326, 329 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970) it was held: 
To be entitled to recover damages for a 
breach of that warranty [of merchantability] 
by reason of a defect in a product, the 
plaintiff must sustain the burden of 
affirmatively establishing that "the 
instrumentality causing injury was 'in a 
defective condition on the date it was delivered'" 
[Citations omitted], i.e., that there was 
no change in its condition from the time of 
its purchase until the time of the accident. 
(Emphasis added) 
Similarly in Holcomb v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 8 UCC 
Reporting Service 992 (5th Cir. 1971) it was held: 
In the absence of proof of a defect in an 
article on the date of delivery, the manufacturer 
thereof may not be held liable on the theory 
of implied warranty, United States Rubber Co. 
v. Bauer, supra. 
[I]n view of his ultimate concession 
that the extra tolerance was probably due to 
wear, we are inescapably driven to the unavoidable 
conclusion that as to the engines the evidence 
for the plaintiff simply failed to raise an 
issue for submission to a jury on the question 
of implied liability. 
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Two particularly relevant cases are Kriedler v. Pontiac 
Division of General Motors Corp., 15 UCC Reporting Service 
798 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974) and Falcon Equipment Corp. v. 
Courtesy Lincoln Mercury, Inc., 19 UCC Reporting service 
(8th Cir. 1976). 
In Kriedler the Court held: 
In the absence of proof that the implied 
warranty is of a continuing nature, such as for 
a fixed period of time, such warranty relates 
to the time of sale and does not cover future 
defects not in existence at such time or 
inherent in the article sold. [Citations 
omitted] 
The evidence, given the construction most 
favorable to Kriedler's case, is not sufficient 
to negate the possibility of an intermediate 
act or agency (that is, an act or cause arising 
after delivery and before the engine fire), 
producing the engine failure. Neither is the 
evidence sufficient to negate access to and 
possible misrepair or maltreatment of the 
engine by others. 19 UCC Reporting Service at 
483. 
The holding in Falcon is similar: 
The record also fails to show a breach 
of the implied warranty of merchantability or 
a breach of the express warranty since there 
is not sufficient evidence that any problems 
with the car were the result of defective 
conditions existing at the time of its sale 
or delivery. [Citations omitted] In fact, 
much of the repair history of the Mark IV 
could conceivably be viewed as mere maintenance 
resulting from the use of a car which had 
been driven approximately 33,000 miles at the 
time of trial. 15 UCC Reporting Service 
at 799. 
Defendant concedes that many of the mechanical problems 
experienced by the backhoe ". could be attributable to 
ordinary wear and tear on the machine" (Brief of Appellant, p • 
46), or were " • caused by mechanics• (Brief of Appellant, 
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p. 47). Therefore, as Defendant concedes on page 47 of its 
Brief, it is " an impossible burden under the state of 
the evidence " for Defendant to establish that the 
mechanical problems Defendant asserts constitute a breach of 
the implied warranty of merchantability stem from some defect 
or lack of merchantability existing at the outset of the lease 
rather than from some act or cause arising after delivery. In 
making this admission, Defendant concedes that it has not 
established a breach of the implied warranty of merchantabili~. 
It is not Instruction Nos. 25 and 29 which are inaccurate 
statements of the law; it is Instruction No. 27, requested 
by the Defendant, which is an inaccurate statement of the law. 
Plaintiffs objected to that sentence in Instruction No. 27 
which states that the implied warranty of merchantability 
attaches to the backhoe for each separate monthly term on the 
grounds that " ..• the backhoe was either merchantable or not 
at the time the same was leased and the term of the lease in 
this case is for an indefinite period of time after a minimum 
of thirty days." (Tr. 977). 
The lease agreement [Ex. P-1] states that " ••• [t]he 
term of this lease shall be a minimum of 30 days beginning on 
March 21, 1977 and for such additional days as lessee may 
require such equipment." There is only one lease and only one 
warranty of merchantability. There is simply no basis in the 
law or in the evidence for Defendant's argument that each 
month of the lease constitutes a separate lease term which 
gives rise to a separate and new warranty of merchantability. 
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Under the test for reversible error with respect to 
instructions as enunciated by this and other courts, there 
must be some prejudice to the complaining party. In 
Rowley v. Graven Brothers & Co., 26 Utah 2d 448, 491 P.2d 
1209 (1971); Wilkerson Motor Co., Inc. v. Johnson, 589 
P.2d 505 (Okla. 1978); and Nelson v. Mueller, 533 P.2d 383 
(Wash. 1975). Because the erroneous Instruction No. 27 
was more favorable to the Defendant than the correct rule 
of law as set forth in Instruction Nos. 25 and 29, any 
prejudice caused thereby was in the Defendant's favor and 
thus provides no grounds for reversal. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED NO ERROR 
BY GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 20. 
Defendant contends that the Judge committed prejudicial 
error by giving Instruction No. 20, which reads as follows: 
Where it is difficult to determine whether a 
particular act merely sheds light on the 
meaning of the agreement or represents a 
waiver of a term of the agreement, the 
preference is in favor of waiver. Thus even 
if you find that the plaintiff on occasion 
did not charge the defendant for certain 
repairs or gave the defendant credit for 
downtime, the preferred interpretation of 
such action is that the plaintiff waived its 
claim against the defendant for those repairs 
and downtime not charged for rather than 
the interpretation that such action constitutes 
a course of performance which indicates an 
intent not to charge the defendant for any 
downtime or for any repairs. [R. 363] 
Defendant argues two points in support of its contention 
of error; first, that it is, in effect, a directed verdict on 
the issue of waiver and, second, that it is an inaccurate 
statement of the law. Neither of Defendant's points is correct. 
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The first sentence, and the substance of Instruction No. 
20, is a direct quote from Official Comment No. 3 to Section 
70A-2-208 of Article II of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, 
which the trial court found applicable to the present lease 
transaction. (Appellant's Brief at 38-9). The second sentence 
merely applies that rule of interpretation to the facts of the 
present case. 
Despite the assertion of the Defendant in its Brief that 
the court instructed the jury that they "must find a waiver" 
(Appellant's Brief at 50), it is clear from reading the instruc-
tion that it merely sets forth a rule of interpretation, and 
in no way constitutes a directed verdict on the issue of waiv~. 
CONCLUSION 
The lease agreement in this case was fairly negotiated 
between the parties and is clear as to its terms and conditions. 
The backhoe was selected by the Defendant and the Defendant 
was fully aware of the machine's capabilities, having leased 
this same backhoe twice previously. The backhoe was inspected 
by the Defendant prior to delivery. Following certain repairs 
at the first construction site, the Defendant elected to 
continue the use of the backhoe for approximately ten (10) 
months. While the backhoe required repairs during the term of 
the lease, the evidence is clear and the jury found that the 
responsibility for the payment of such repairs was the Defenda~'s 
The evidence was not only substantial, but in some instances 
overwhelming and unrebutted that the repairs were necessitated 
by reason of lack of proper maintenance by the Defendant and 
negligence and abuse in the operation of the backhoe by the 
Defendant. 
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The lease agreement provides that following the expira-
tion of. the minimum term of thirty (30) days either party may 
terminate the Agreement upon five (5) days' written notice. 
The Defendant never exercised its right of termination at any 
time. Rather, the Defendant chose to use the machine from 
October, 1977 until January 20, 1978 without making any lease 
payments whatsoever and failed and refused to pay for repairs. 
Why the Defendant did not terminate the lease if the problems 
with the backhoe were as extensive as the Defendant urged at 
trial and now urges before this Court is a mystery yet unsolved. 
This Court has repeatedly announced the rule that a jury 
verdict will not be disturbed in the absence of substantial 
prejudice. A necessary corollary to that rule is that there 
must be some solidarity in the jury verdict and that if it can 
be easily set aside, the right to trial by jury is weakened. 
The Defendant, by its appeal, claims this Court should now 
undertake a complete review of the evidence received and heard 
by the jury over a nine (9) day trial. The Defendant, in 
essence, seeks to have this Court substitute its judgment for 
that of the jury and the trial judge who denied Defendant's 
post-trial motions. Such violates the rule of appellate 
review as enunciated and followed by this Court. No argument 
can reasonably be made which would result in a conclusion 
other than that the Defendant received a fair and impartial 
trial, the jury considered, sorted and weighed all of the 
evidence presented and that the Defendant has in no way suffered 
any prejudice. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Plaintiffs submit that the 
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Judgment on Verdict of Jury and the Order of the trial court 
denying:the Defendant's Motion to Amend Judgment or in the 
Alternative for a New Trial be sustained and affirmed and that 
the Plaintiffs be awarded their costs on appeal. 
DATED this ;j IJ;. day of May, 198 0. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
Attorneys for'Plaintiffs and 
Respondents 
310 South Main Street, 12th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-3300 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that two copies of the above and 
foregoing Respondents' Brief was served upon the Defendant 
herein by hand delivering a copy thereof to its attorney 
James A. Mcintosh, 36 South State Street, Suite 800, Salt 
Lake City, Utah this .{:if!_ day of May, 1980. 
~ ~ L~l~£/i~ll 
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